39 which the enemy does, they can be completely defeated. We could chase them so that they lose the advantages that they go to find in these ports and those they achieve by taking prizes, and we could better ensure that they could not join together to lay siege to our fortresses or try to prevent our carracks going to Portugal, as has happened in the past. Although it was not possible to put right the damage, we had suffered so that we could pursue the enemy as would have been best, nevertheless we were for the time safe from other harm that could have been done to our fortresses, so they were secure for the time being and safe from any surprises that might be feared. Our reputation had recovered from the depths to which it had fallen because of the freedom with which our enemies cruised and made captures and contracts and took on provisions in safety whether they were many of few. Now the Moors realize that henceforward this will not be so, if this fleet is maintained as it should be, and that if it is so powerful in these seas, enemies sailing in them must be in larger companies, and cost more, and take fewer prizes (1), and that our merchants can sail without hindrance and be more profitable to His Majesty’s customs and more beneficial to his vassals. All these are points I should make to bring everyone in agreement about the maintenance and preservation if this fleet, each one as befits and concerns him. After all that has been described had taken place, a 1- This is true. See on this point: FOSTER, English Factories in India, 1624-29, p.v.sqq. For Contemporary English accounts of these three battles v.FOSTER, op.cit., and for the Dutch version v.Dagh-register, cit.
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