41 but he was unwilling to do that because it was directly against the orders he had been given, to ensure the safety of Muscat if the enemy were to return, and that seemed more important than anything else at the time. However, he sent two of the galleons(1) which were most crippled to be repaired there, remaining in Muscat with the other six. While this was going on in Muscat news came that the Viceroy was sending reinforcements, and a message arrived from Francisco Muniz, Captain of Bassein, that the enemy was in Surat, preparing to return to the Strait. Nuno Alvares thought he should go to wait for the reinforcements and guard them from Cape Ras – el – Had and leaving at once with his six galleons he met the reinforcements and brought them into Muscat. Because of the desert nature of Muscat and its inconvenience for everything involved in preparing a fleet, and the shortcomings and the brevity of time and many other difficulties, he could not refit as was needed. But doing all that could be done, he prepared the six galleons(2) and left Muscat with them on 24 August to wait off Surat for the enemy fleets who usually gather there, those from Europe as well as those from the south and is the place which the enemy treat as their headquarters. Making landfall on 20 September, he learned that there were about five English and Dutch carracks in the Surat deeps. Although he had only four galleons with him, 1- “Sao Sebastiao” and “Trindade” (Letter from the Viceroy of 28 February 1626). 2- This should be seven
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