111 do the work at Bahrein and Sharjah.” 3 On 1 January 1944, the issue of American installations was further studied by London in light of the response of the Middle East Headquarters of the Air Ministry and the necessity to preserve the position of the British in the Gulf as is. However, in spite of the fact that this was an issue of great importance, the Air Ministry decided to go by the view of the Secretary of State for India who was in support of the Americans using Bahrain and Sharjah. The impossibility of the R.A.F being able to carry out the required work for the Americans was his reason to try to divert them to use the Persian Coast instead. To this effect, the Secretary of State for India in the British Government wrote a number of letters to the Political Resident in the Gulf, the British India Government, the External Affairs Department, London, and the political Agent in Bahrain. He stated: “ Instructions are accordingly being issued to R.A.F Headquarter that every effort should be made to carry out necessary constructional work for Americans in Bahrein and Sharjah ourselves.” 4 As for the Americans, they continued to press for an early response regarding Bahrain. As a result, the British requested from the Government of Bahrain to rent a plot of land for the construction of the requisite US army installations. The approval came in an oral form delivered by the Advisor to the Government of Bahrain. The work was then decided to start on 15 January 1944 and to be completed by 15 March 1944. This should have provided enough time for the installations to become operational by 1 April 1944. Of relevance to our purpose here are the facilities erected in Bahrain and Sharjah. Those were: - Bahrain: construction of facilities to accommodate 20 officers and 80 men, in addition to others for transit to accommodate 100 officers and 100men. The permanent installations would be 3 Ibid., L.P.&S/12/2043, EXT.39/1943. 4 Ibid., L.P.&S/12/2043, EXT.40/1944. AMERICANS IN SHARJAH
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