131 Agency there, and even then, we must proceed very slowly.” 11 On 17 November 1948, the Political Resident in the Gulf wrote to the Foreign Office, London, commenting on some proposals made in the Fayyid Commander-in-Chief conference which he had attended. He stated: “ On the 4th of November, I attended a Commander-in-chief’s conference at Fayyid in order to discuss certain proposals which had been made for providing protection in the case of a sudden emergency arising in any of the Gulf States. 2. The conference had before them a paper containing a proposal that five companies of Levies should be raised, two of which should be located at Bahrain and one each at Kuwait, Qatar and Sharjah. I deprecated this proposal partly owing to the difficulty of finding suitable material for the Levies and partly because I considered the location of such Levies at Kuwait, Bahrain and Qatar was, for the present unnecessary. The conclusion reached was that a scheme should be evolved for flying troops to Kuwait and Qatar in the event of an emergency arising and that the proposal to raise Levies for Sharjah should be further considered.” 12 Consequently, British troops frequently arrived to the civil Sharjah Air Station transforming it to a military base without the need to make any changes to the agreement signed in 1932 where the British had stated that Sharjah Air Station would remain civil. 11 Ibid., pp.11−13. 12 Ibid., p.49. FROM A CIVIL AIR STATION TO A MILITARY BASE
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